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Fair value accounting has played a speciﬁ  c role in the current crisis. Its application raises a number of 
different issues; while some are currently being addressed by the relevant standard setters, others have a 
more macroeconomic dimension.
As regards the immediate drawbacks of the fair value approach, both standard setters and banking 
supervisors are working on guidance on how to value ﬁ  nancial instruments in times of stress and the 
appropriate internal processes that should be in place in ﬁ  nancial institutions to achieve this.
However, the crisis has also highlighted some more macro-ﬁ  nancial issues. In this respect, central banks, 
thanks to the overview they have of the ﬁ  nancial system and their central role in money markets, seem 
well-positioned to be the guardians of ﬁ  nancial stability. In order to play this role, cooperation must be 
enhanced between central banks, standard setters and supervisors.
NB: The views expressed here represent the opinions of the author and do not necessarily express those of the Banque de France or the Basel Committee.ARTICLES
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T
he turmoil we have been experiencing for 
the last year has highlighted a number of 
challenges for central bankers, supervisors 
and global regulators.
It began as a crisis with very traditional features: the 
poor underwriting standards of non-regulated entities 
created poor quality loans that were used in a very 
complex and lengthy chain of securitisation, whose 
intermediaries were not able, and even sometimes 
not willing, to analyse the underlying risks.
What is interesting from a ﬁ  nancial stability point 
of view is that a problem that was speciﬁ  c to the 
United States spread to the rest of the world through 
ﬁ  nancial markets. Of course, the globalisation of 
ﬁ  nancial systems, which implies greater efﬁ  ciency 
of information and ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows for the best and 
the worst, has contributed signiﬁ  cantly. However, 
the relationship between liquidity and valuation 
was a speciﬁ  c feature of this crisis that highlighted 
challenges related to the impact of fair value 
accounting on ﬁ  nancial stability.
What we have been seeing since autumn 2007 is a 
negative liquidity-valuation spiral that, partly because 
of a number of failures over ﬁ  nancial disclosures, 
greatly impacted conﬁ  dence in the market creating 
a global liquidity freeze in the interbank market and 
gave rise to massive downgrades and write downs.
How can we address these challenges and 
dynamics? Some of them can and are likely to 
be addressed by relevant standard setters and 
supervisors. Indeed, much focus has been placed in 
diverse international fora on those issues in order 
to improve the situation, enhance conﬁ  dence and 
put the market back on track. In addition, ﬁ  nancial 
institutions themselves have made considerable 
efforts to improve the disclosure of their risks 
and exposures. It is very likely that this trend 
will continue and that proposals will be made by 
market participants with a view to reducing the 
complexity and opaqueness of ﬁ  nancial products.
However, there may also be challenges of a 
different nature, which are therefore more difﬁ  cult 
to deal with. For example, the addition of sound 
individual decisions does not always make for 
sound macroeconomic policy at the system’s level. 
Consequently, these issues must be considered from 
a wider perspective and, in this context, central 
banks may be well positioned as the guardians of 
ﬁ  nancial stability.
In Part 1|, we will look at the challenges evidenced by the 
recent turmoil and how they should be addressed, while 
in Part 2| we will consider the more macroeconomic 
trends related to fair value accounting.
1| F AIR VALUE ACCOUNTING 
  IN TIMES OF STRESS: 
  CHALLENGES FOR FINANCIAL 
  INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORS
Under both International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRSs) and US Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (US GAAP) more and 
more of the assets and liabilities of banks and 
other companies are to be measured at fair value. 
Under these two sets of standards, the deﬁ  nition 
of fair value is not exactly the same but the basic 
framework is very similar. The objective of fair 
value accounting is to replicate market prices and 
is based on the availability of market inputs for 
valuation. This implies that ﬁ  nancial instruments 
are valued using market prices (if there is a market) 
or using the market of a similar instrument if there 
is no market for this speciﬁ  c instrument, or using 
Table 1
Fair value hierarchy under IFRS and US GAAP
IFRS – IAS 39 US GAAP – FAS 157
Level 1 = quoted prices 
in an active market
Level 1 = market prices
Level 2 =  more recent 
quoted price
Level 3 = estimation of fair 
value by reference to similar 
ﬁ  nancial instruments Level 2 = model prices 
with observable inputs Level 4 = valuation techniques 
incorporating a maximum 
of observable data
Level 5 = valuation 
techniques incorporating 
non observable data
Level 3 = model prices 
with no observable inputs
Note: Following recent discussions with IASB, it seems likely that it will adopt, 
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model-based valuation techniques (with or without 
market inputs depending on their availability). 
All these different inputs determine the different 
levels in the fair value hierarchy.
The situation that has prevailed since the end of 
August 2007 highlighted a number of critical issues 
related to the valuation of ﬁ  nancial instruments. This 
applies to both complex instruments as well as the 
more traditional ones that became illiquid, making 
it much more difﬁ  cult to ﬁ  nd market-based prices. 
As liquidity quickly evaporated in the market for 
many complex structured products and primary and 
secondary transaction prices became unavailable, 
most banks and ﬁ  nancial institutions switched from 
valuation methods based on observable prices or 
deemed to be observable (indices) to methods that 
relied more on model-based valuations. In some 
instances, such model based valuations required
the extensive use of unobservable inputs.
1|1  What is an active market?
Under accounting standards, there is no clear 
deﬁ  nition of what is actually an active market 
and when and under which condition ﬁ  nancial 
institutions can move from a market price to a 
model price. Besides, no common understanding, 
for example, exists of what can be considered as a 
distressed or forced sale vis-à-vis market prices in a 
rapidly deteriorating environment. This has been 
a major source of uncertainty in the last months 
and contributed to put banks’ risk management and 
valuation units under stress. 
In other words, the crisis highlights that there is a 
need for relevant standard setters to clarify some 
deﬁ  nitions, notably that of an observable market 
price and, more generally, of an active market.
This may imply identifying a set of factors or 
accumulation of evidences, that can be used as 
“proof” that there is no longer an active market. 
This deﬁ  nition would help ﬁ  nancial intermediaries 
to determine the conditions under which they can 
move to model prices.
1|2 Valuation 
and risk management processes
in adverse market conditions
The recent crisis also calls into question the capacity 
of risk management and valuation units to cope with 
adverse situations. Both the ofﬁ  cial and the private 
sector recognises that major risk management and 
governance shortcomings were exposed during 
the crisis. Indeed, the situation emphasised the 
difﬁ  culties in estimating fair values due to the 
lack of liquidity in the market, the complexity of 
some ﬁ  nancial instruments and the shift by some 
banks to more model-based methodologies which 
increased the use of unobservable inputs. All these 
factors strained the capacity of business units 
and control functions tasked with the necessary 
veriﬁ   cation and validation and led to delays
in producing valuations.
Moreover, with the need for ”rapid roll-out”  of some 
new valuation models and the extension of other 
existing models to a broader range of products than 
originally intended, the usual degree of internal 
scrutiny was not applied in all cases. Banks that 
had made earlier investments to develop more 
rigorous valuation and governance processes, 
and that had used a diversiﬁ  ed range of valuation 
approaches and information sources, were better 
positioned to deal with valuation uncertainty when 
market liquidity dried up.
The crisis therefore clearly showed that guidance is 
needed on how to value products when active markets 
do not exist anymore. It also highlights that ﬁ  nancial 
institutions have to develop adequate internal 
management processes in order to put in place the 
right expertise for valuation modelling, including the 
use of a selected and diversiﬁ  ed series of inputs.
This requires for example to have a speciﬁ  c team to 
work on  valuation models, another one to review, 
independently, the models used, to regularly back 
test and calibrate the results of models in order to 
check their accuracy, to carry out internal controls 
of the whole process and to use, wherever possible, 
a wide diversity of inputs.ARTICLES
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1|3 Accounting  choices
versus business strategies
Part of the valuation uncertainties experienced by 
ﬁ  nancial institutions stemmed from the fact that 
the prior allocation of assets to the different sets 
of portfolios have not been made with sufﬁ  cient 
due diligence in all cases. In fact, some banks 
may have paid attention to the consequences
of allocating assets to the different books more in 
terms of proﬁ  t and loss or capital charge (e.g. capital 
charge in the trading book is lower than that in 
the banking book) than in terms of the relevant 
business strategies. Clearly at the time of the crisis, 
some instruments were allocated to the trading 
book or fair value option portfolios whereas, given 
their speciﬁ  c features, they should have been 
allocated to another portfolio.
As consequence of this regulatory arbitrage, some 
instruments were not allocated to the right portfolio 
which  exacerbated the inherent complexity of 
applying risk and valuation models.
Therefore it is important that ﬁ  nancial institutions 
exercise more scrutiny and caution when performing 
their initial portfolio allocation.
This scrutiny is especially necessary under IFRS 
since, contrary to what may be possible under
US GAAP, the transfer from one portfolio to another 
is extremely difﬁ  cult.
1|4  Adjustments to valuation modelling
Much of the uncertainty that led to the loss of 
conﬁ  dence between market participants was also 
due to the sudden and massive writedowns that 
were seen since last summer.
The severity of these writedowns partly resulted 
from the very high initial levels of valuation. During 
the upside, ﬁ  nancial statements using market prices 
took at face value the latter, irrespective of the fact 
that some risks may not have been priced correctly 
in the market. This contributed to increase balance 
sheets and fostered further leverage.  To put it another 
way, no adjustments were made, in the upturn, to 
“observable market prices”, although they sometimes 
appeared overvalued or to underprice true risks.
It relates, for instance, to the poor grasp of liquidity 
risk associated with instruments trading in very thin 
markets already before the crisis erupted. 
Valuation measurement and management processes 
need to incorporate, in addition to a wide range of 
inputs, all the relevant adjustments that should be 
embedded in prices. A major challenge is to ensure 
that valuation models factor in the whole spectrum 
of risks even when markets conditions are benign. 
Were such adjustments are made on an ongoing 
basis, this could remove a source of procyclicality 
in  accounting rules. Valuations derived from models 
may be more robust and reliable and asset price 
cycles may be less pronounced. 
Consequently, it seems reasonable to apply, in 
valuation modelling, and on an on going basis, a list 
of adjustments to fully take into account all risks 
that should be embedded in the prices of ﬁ  nancial 
instruments, including, beyond credit risk, model 
risk and liquidity risk.
1|5 Consistency  between 
accounting/prudential and risk 
management assessments
These adjustments to valuation modelling may, 
however, be different from risk management 
practices which analysis must be, by deﬁ  nition, more 
forward-looking. For example, stress tests are a risk 
Table 2
Portfolio classiﬁ  cation for accounting (IFRS) 
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management tool and not a valuation adjustment. In 
an ideal situation, reporting for ﬁ  nancial statements, 
prudential ones and internal management, should 
be based on the same ﬁ  gures. However, it may 
not be the case as their respective objectives are 
not the same. Financial statements should give an 
information on the value of one entity at a speciﬁ  c 
point in time in order to give adequate information 
to investors. Prudential information should provide 
supervisors with a prudent assessment of the 
situation of one entity taking into account, for 
example, expected future losses. At the same time 
supervisors are reluctant to take into account future 
gains which explain that they introduced prudential 
ﬁ  lters (see infra).
Above all that, risk management should be even more 
forward looking as it has to integrate management 
strategy, capital planning… To summarise, even if, 
in the three types of assessments, the initial basis is 
the same (same inputs, same models...), the outputs 
should be different based on different objectives. 
The starting point is the accounting assessment 
which provides a kind of “median view” taking 
into account the situation “point in time”, then the 
prudential assessment take the same information as 
the accounting but disregard the “good news” factored 
in the market price (latent gains) and only takes into 
account “bad news” (fair value losses). And lastly, if 
risk management assessment is also starting from 
the same accounting ﬁ  gures, it should stress current 
market conditions in order to have a more forward 
looking approach. These last results should be taken 
into account in the economic capital allocation and 
the capital planning of each institution.
1|6 No  more  disclosures
but better ones
The multiplicity of risk assessment approaches, 
established on the basis of different requirements 
–ﬁ  nancial reporting, prudential assessment and 
risk management–, increases the difﬁ  culties in 
understanding financial and risk information. 
It also makes disclosure to market participants 
more complex. These layers of complexity, 
together with balance sheet and proﬁ  t and loss 
volatility associated with the increasing use of fair 
valuation can exacerbate investors’ uneasiness as 
they confront very challenging market conditions, 
raise uncertainty and undermine confidence.
There is, therefore, a strong and urgent need to 
improve disclosure and, above all, to enhance the 
quality content of these disclosures. In doing so, 
ﬁ  nancial institutions should also provide investors with 
information regarding the uncertainty of valuations 
especially when the time horizon increases. Financial 
institutions should improve disclosures about the 
methodologies, inputs and parameters used as well 
as about the uncertainly surrounding valuation, 
for example, by disclosing sensitivity measures.
These disclosures should help market participants 
to understand better each institution’s risk proﬁ  le. 
Also, because investors need to assess risk proﬁ  les in 
relative terms, these disclosures must be made with 
a certain degree of homogeneity in order to help the 
market, to make meaningful comparisons.
All the above factors illustrate the most immediate 
drawbacks of the current situation that the crisis has 
brought to the fore. Following the recommendations 
of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), the relevant 
international fora, namely the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision and the International 
Accounting Standards Board, are working on 
these issues in order that the latter improve its 
recommendations and guidance related to fair 
value accounting in times of stress, and the former 
enhance its recommendations for the supervisory 
assessment of banks’ valuation practices.
Many improvements have already been seen 
regarding disclosures. The FSF provided a template 
for ﬁ  nancial institutions to disclose their risks 
Table 3
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and exposures related to the current crisis and 
most, if not all, G10 supervisors have sought to 
ensure that banks complied with this requirement.
Indeed, some banks have already provided the 
relevant information.
However, some issues relating to the macroeconomic 
impact of regulation seem more difﬁ  cult to resolve. 
The latter essentially stem from the fact that the 
addition of sound entity speciﬁ  c measures, when 
applied in the same way, at the same time, by all 
market participants, may raise macroeconomic 
difﬁ  culties.1 These discussions can today be 
resumed by the question as to whether current 
accounting and prudential regulations may have 
procyclical effects. However difﬁ  cult to determine 
these procyclical effects may be, central banks 
seem well positioned to play the role of guardians 
of ﬁ  nancial stability.
In addition to this, new regulations such as fair value 
accounting blur the traditional frontiers between trading 
and banking books, risks, and market participants, 
increasing its ﬁ  nancial stability impacts.
2| F AIR VALUE ACCOUNTING 
  AND FINANCIAL STABILITY: 
  QUESTIONS FOR CENTRAL BANKS 
  AND GLOBAL POLICY MAKERS
2|1  Fair value accounting has led
to the blurring of traditional frontiers
THE BLURRED DISTINCTION BETWEEN BOOKS
AND THE ISSUE OF CONSISTENCY
Before the widespread introduction of fair value 
accounting, there was a clear distinction between 
banks’ trading book which was marked-to-market 
and banks’ banking book held at historical cost. 
Accounting practices were in line with banking 
strategies and mirrored prudential classiﬁ  cation. 
This situation also allowed for a better alignement 
of accounting/prudential and risk management 
expertise as the ﬁ   rst two types of assessments 
were clearly aligned. In addition, the low volatility 
of historical cost implies less necessity for risk 
management to be proactive and gives rise to 
different types of incentives than marked-to-market. 
At the same time, the trading book did not raise any 
concern from a prudential point of view given that 
this portfolio was restricted to liquid assets, held 
with a very short term horizon.
This situation can be summarised as follows:
Table 4
Relationships between accounting
and prudential classiﬁ  cations











   Trading 
book
Fair value 






   Banking 
book
Fair value 
through equity Banking book
Amortised 
cost
The current situation raises many challenges for:
￿ internal management to understand and choose 
the right portfolio from the outset;
￿ ﬁ  nancial reporting to provide relevant explanations;
￿ prudential supervisors who decided to “breach the 
consistency” and create “prudential ﬁ  lters”, whose 
objective is to preserve the stability of prudential 
capital whose deﬁ  nition would otherwise have 
been automatically affected. However, these ﬁ  lters 
are only a partial solution to a likely procyclical 
effect of fair value accounting as they only apply 
to fair value through equity (basically available 
for sale assets) as it would have been too complex 
to implement ﬁ  lters on instruments at fair value 
through proﬁ  t and loss.
In addition to these prudential ﬁ  lters applicable to 
assets, there is also a systematic ﬁ  lter applicable to 
1  See, for example, the “lessons from Millenium bridge” in the article by Shin, Plantin and Sapra in this issue of the Financial Stability Review.ARTICLES
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the fair valuation of own credit risk on the liability 
side. The objective there is exclude from the 
calculation of solvency ratios accounting proﬁ  ts that 
can be generated from a bank’s own debt as soon as 
its ﬁ  nancial situation deteriorates.
Basically, at the same time that it led to blurring 
the traditional frontiers between books, fair value 
accounting also made it impossible to align 
accounting/prudential and risk management 
assessments.
This situation of increased complexity between 
accounting and prudential ﬁ  gures may provide 
incentives for arbitrages and creates a number of 
difﬁ  culties in understanding ﬁ  nancial statements. 
All in all, it does not foster market conﬁ  dence.
THE BLURRING OF THE FRONTIER BETWEEN RISKS 
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES IN TERMS OF CAPITAL NEEDS
The application of fair value accounting means that 
any liquidity or valuation shock immediately affects 
the level of capital.
The example of the recent crisis is striking in 
this respect.
What we have seen since last year is a massive wave 
of recapitalisations (up to USD 302 billion at the 
end of June 2008 representing nearly 80% of the 
total write downs and more than eight times the 
credit losses.
This new trend is directly linked to the application 
of fair value accounting since the spiral between 
liquidity and valuation had a direct impact on 
proﬁ  t and loss accounts and then on the capital 
base. Consequently, the introduction of fair value 
accounting could mean that a liquidity crisis might 
very rapidly affect capital levels.
Table 6
Write downs and recapitalisation








2007 27 December 74 23 97
2008 22 January 107 26 133
31 120 26 146
22 February 135 26 162
29 154 27 181
7 March 162 26 188
14 169 26 195
26 182 26 208
1 April 206 26 232 136 59
10 216 29 245 163 66
21 248 42 290 231 80
28 269 43 312 231 74
9 May 280 43 323 231 71
19 332 47 379 266 70
16 June 344 47 391 310 79
20 349 47 396 302 76
Source: Bloomberg, sample of over 70 international banks.
Table 5
Prudential ﬁ  lters applicable to available 










Either like loans or like equities
Equity
Recognition in Tier1 of unrealised 
losses/partial recognition of 
unrealised gains in Tier2
Loan
No recognition of any unrealised 
loss/unrealised gain
Objective: Not to affect the current deﬁ   nition of regulatory capital
for accounting reasons alone. }
Figure 1
The vicious circle of valuation and liquidity
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It should be noted that this trend can easily be reversed. 
If we reach a point where some investors begin to 
come back to the market and buy, then we will note 
upward pressure on liquidity and valuation having 
a direct impact on proﬁ  t and loss accounts through 
unrealised gains, creating additional capital.
In conclusion, the main consequence of accounting rules 
is that capital comes under strong pressure as its level 
may be subject to a high degree of volatility. By making 
the link between solvency risk and other risks more 
direct, they make the need for ﬁ  nancial intermediaries 
to have a strong capital base even more pressing than 
before. At the same time, this new volatility may pave 
the way for banks to have, within their capital base, 
some ﬂ  exible instruments that can move in line with 
accounting requirements. Hybrid  or contingent capital 
–whose level should be carefully monitored given its 
lower quality than regular capital– could be a solution.
THE BLURRED DISTINCTION BETWEEN 
DIFFERENT TYPES OF MARKET PARTICIPANTS/
THE USEFULNESS OF CONTRARIANS
The recent crisis erupted against the background of 
changing ﬁ  nancial systems. It is a well documented 
fact that the range of ﬁ  nancial entities or quasi-entities 
has expanded from traditional regulated (e.g. banks) 
to unregulated intermediaries (e.g. hedge funds)
to increasingly important “light legal structures”
(e.g. conduits, SIV, …), which have risk proﬁ  les similar 
to banks’ –i.e. bearing risk that is generally of a
long-term nature and ﬁ  nanced short-term–, but do not 
face the same regulatory constraints. In such two-tier 
systems, “non-banks” act like banks but without having 
to adhere to banking regulations (no capital ratio for 
example, enabling them to increase their leverage) 
and no compulsory fair value accounting.
Hedge funds do not have to fulﬁ  l the same disclosure 
and transparency requirements. In terms of the level 
playing ﬁ  eld and arbitrage opportunities it is certainly 
not an optimal situation. However, as far as accounting 
is concerned for example, some may argue that not 
having to comply with such accounting requirements 
enable them to position themselves as buyers in 
some markets. Clearly, in this case, the diversity of 
rules enabled some actors to act as contrarians in the 
market, which may be needed to offset part of the 
negative impact of herd behaviour. 
2|2 What  might 
the macroeconomic impact 
of fair value accounting be?
One of the most difﬁ  cult problems to resolve is that 
the overall application of reasonable individual 
measures does not always result in a sound 
macroeconomic framework.
The application of fair value accounting may have 
a number of different impacts. On the one hand, 
market price changes impact ﬁ  nancial statement 
faster, thereby adding to volatility. On the other hand, 
through the quick disclosure of risks, it helps improve 
transparency. The latter is critical. As a matter of fact, 
raising transparency was certainly a key objective 
pursued by regulators and policymakers since the 
beginning of the crisis. 
To provide investors with the possibility of checking, 
in close to real time, the value of portfolios, 
fair value accounting assumes however that:
￿  markets always efficiently price assets and 
discriminate amongst risks;
￿ investors do not herd and take their decisions based 
on all available information.
If this is not the case, fair value does not prevent 
the development of asset bubbles and may even 
contribute and exacerbate movements that are 
out of line with fundamental price dynamics.
As documented in Adrian and Shin (2008), 
ﬁ  nancial intermediaries adjust their balance sheets 
dynamically in reaction to asset price movements 
and do so in such a way that leverage is high during 
booms and low during busts.
With the recent crisis, the situation and the 
macroeconomic impact has been even worse since 
the ﬁ  rst development was a forced re-intermediation 
of loans onto banks’ balance sheets due to the 
reintegration of off-balance sheet SIV exposure that, 
in addition to fair value losses, put a lot of pressure 
on capital ratios.
Therefore, and, surprisingly, the initial impact of 
the current crisis was a “forced” increase in leverage. ARTICLES
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However, after this ﬁ  rst development, the ﬁ  nancial 
system is currently experiencing a deleveraging 
phase. It might be seen as a return to normalcy after 
a period of high and sometimes excessive leverage, 
but the consequences for the ﬁ  nancial system may 
be disruptive because of the procyclical nature 
of leverage.
In other words, financial institutions might be 
prompted to deleverage more than necessary, 
especially in an environment where fair value 
accounting is widely used.
All these issues are clearly among the most 
difﬁ  cult ones to address, showing that diversity
(of practices, rules, etc.) is needed. This goes 
against the principle of harmonisation of practices 
and the search for a level playing ﬁ  eld; however, 
to ensure the smooth functioning of markets, 
diversity of strategies seems to be key.
REDUCING PROCYCLICALITY IN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: 
THE ROLE OF CENTRAL BANKS
This question immediately raises another one: 
what exactly is procyclicality? Two situations can 
be characterised as procyclical: the ﬁ  rst is a situation 
in which a speciﬁ  c regulation ampliﬁ  es ﬂ  uctuations 
in natural cycles. It is a kind of exacerbation of 
natural trends. It seems to be the situation that we 
have been experiencing since last year where the 
evaporation of liquidity on some markets has led to 
massive write downs.
A second deﬁ  nition may be more problematic 
from an economic and a ﬁ  nancial stability point 
of view. It is the case where a speciﬁ  c regulation 
changes the natural economic trend, because, 
for example, of misaligned incentives. This may 
be the case, for example, if fair value accounting 
or other measures, such as the widespread use
of VaR modelling for prudential purposes, leads 
to a shift in business investment/strategies 
towards short-term horizons. Even if there is no 
strong evidence of such a shift at this stage, these 
issues have to be carefully considered by global
policy makers
In this context, what can be done and who should
do it? In other words, who could act as the guardians 
of ﬁ  nancial stability? 
Central banks may be well positioned to do this. In 
fact, so far, both prudential and accounting rules have 
favoured a one-entity approach. Accounting rules 
applicable to one entity provide the market with a 
true and fair view of the value of that entity. In a 
similar way, supervisors are in charge of ensuring 
that there is an adequate level of capital for risks at 
each entity level.
In this context, the question of who is in charge 
of the overall allocation of funds at the economy 
level or the stability of the ﬁ  nancial system as a 
whole, remains open, even, if, in the light of recent 
events, central banks seem to be in charge of this 
difﬁ  cult and dual mandate: monetary stability 
and ﬁ  nancial stability. A ﬁ  rst step, in order to do 
Figure 2
a) In good times
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that, would be to increase cooperation between 
supervisors, standard setters and central banks in 
the following ways. Central banks need to know 
and understand regulation, prudential practices 
and have access to individual information, while 
supervisors need to pass on to market participants 
central banks’ assessments regarding ﬁ  nancial 
stability and integrate in their supervisory action 
macro-prudential safeguards in time of stress 
(it is the case for example when supervisors ask 
banks to have a “through the cycle” approach,
or to implement dynamic stress testing practices 
incorporating second round effects). In a similar 
way, it would be useful to give a more proactive 
role to central banks or global policy makers in 
the governance process of accounting standard 
setters in order for them to be able to understand 
and incorporate in their standards a more “macro-
ﬁ  nancial” perspective.
In these “macro-ﬁ  nancial” assessments, thanks to 
their relations with market participants and their role 
at the centre of money markets, central banks should 
be able to identify, at an early stage, misalignments 
of incentives, market dysfunctions and the likelihood 
of future bubbles or crises. In any event, regulation, 
be it accounting or prudential, appears to be a “public 
good” given its likely impact on market participants’ 
strategies and the economy as a whole. In this 
context, contracyclical measures, in addition to 
current regulations, such as, for example, in the ﬁ  eld 
of accounting, requiring provisioning more in line 
with the growth of credit lending2 could be envisaged 
from a more macroeconomic perspective.
2  Such “dynamic provisioning” has been successfully implemented by the Bank of Spain.ARTICLES
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